Shaping Voices into a Moral Structure

Nozick distinguishes three sources of moral considerations in addition to those comprising the Ethic of Respect, as he calls the libertarian ethic of respect for rights. An Ethic of Responsiveness counsels that one ought to be responsive to the reality of others. Although Nozick's doctrine of reality is technical and contentious, it applies quite naturally to the second voice in the Mr. Bungle affair. The hurt that Mr. Bungle's player did to the women involved brings the Ethic of Responsiveness into play. One would be insensitive to their reality if one merely insisted on the player's right to free speech. An Ethic of Caring builds the third tier of Nozick's new structure, made up of reasons having to do with establishing and maintaining ties of concern, friendship, community, and love. These moral reasons are the ones that have been brought into focus by feminist moral philosophers in recent years. In the present context, however, they define a higher moral goal rather than what's morally fundamental. Respect for rights and responsiveness to the reality of others are morally more basic than ties of caring, I would argue.

To exemplify the point without argument: I may not care for another through no defect in me but only because of distance, say; but the other may have a right to something from me, in virtue of a contract perhaps, which trumps my appropriation of that thing for use by those I care about. Or to make the point at the level of the Ethic of Responsiveness, my appropriation of that thing for the comfort of the people I care about might be to trivialize, to fail to be responsive to, the desperate need of the other. The Ethic of Caring is related to the Ethic of Responsiveness by the same minimum mutilation principle that relates Responsiveness to Rights. It counsels not focusing on Mr. Bungle's reality, even though he may desperately need the outlet provided by LambdaMOO, in order to nurture community.

Finally, the wizard who stuck his neck out displays the Ethic of Light, the imperative to be a selfless vehicle of goodness. On a small scale, he exemplifies the morality of supererogation for which the Ethic of Light is a name. The Ethic of Light represents the strand of moral thinking exemplified by utilitarianism, the idea that the right thing to do is the production of, indeed the maximizing of, goodness. But there are two caveats about this association. First, the Ethic of Light may be tied to a rich and complex theory of goodness and value, not to Jeremy Bentham's reduction of them to pleasure. (See Nozick's The Examined Life for a non-utilitarian conception of value.) Second, the Ethic of Light is not morally fundamental, as utilitarians conceive the Principle of Utility to be. It is contrained by three layers of demands for minimal mutilation before it can come into play. Moral heroes are not exempt from respecting rights, responding to the reality of others, and caring for them. They act over and above the duties generated by the other three layers, not without reference to them.

	CMC Magazine / January 1, 1996
	Wizards, Toads, and Ethics, by Wes Cooper Shaping Voices into a Moral Structure These voices correspond closely enough to a four-layer moral structure which has been recommended recently by the very same philosopher, Robert Nozick, who, in Anarchy, State and Utopia, gave libertarianism its most profound philosophical statement. This structure disputes the presumption that libertarianism is the whole truth about moral constraints and imperatives, while still deeming it morally fundamental. The key to avoiding black-and-white thinking here--"You either respect rights fully or you do wrong"--is Nozick's principle of minimum mutilation. You may pursue higher moral goals than respect for rights, if you do so in such a way as to minimize the infringement of rights. So you may limit Mr. Bungle's right to free speech in the matter of virtual rape, if you do so by toading him rather than, say, forming a vigilante committee to beat him up at his real-life residence. Nozick distinguishes three sources of moral considerations in addition to those comprising the Ethic of Respect, as he calls the libertarian ethic of respect for rights. An Ethic of Responsiveness counsels that one ought to be responsive to the reality of others. Although Nozick's doctrine of reality is technical and contentious, it applies quite naturally to the second voice in the Mr. Bungle affair. The hurt that Mr. Bungle's player did to the women involved brings the Ethic of Responsiveness into play. One would be insensitive to their reality if one merely insisted on the player's right to free speech. An Ethic of Caring builds the third tier of Nozick's new structure, made up of reasons having to do with establishing and maintaining ties of concern, friendship, community, and love. These moral reasons are the ones that have been brought into focus by feminist moral philosophers in recent years. In the present context, however, they define a higher moral goal rather than what's morally fundamental. Respect for rights and responsiveness to the reality of others are morally more basic than ties of caring, I would argue. To exemplify the point without argument: I may not care for another through no defect in me but only because of distance, say; but the other may have a right to something from me, in virtue of a contract perhaps, which trumps my appropriation of that thing for use by those I care about. Or to make the point at the level of the Ethic of Responsiveness, my appropriation of that thing for the comfort of the people I care about might be to trivialize, to fail to be responsive to, the desperate need of the other. The Ethic of Caring is related to the Ethic of Responsiveness by the same minimum mutilation principle that relates Responsiveness to Rights. It counsels not focusing on Mr. Bungle's reality, even though he may desperately need the outlet provided by LambdaMOO, in order to nurture community. Finally, the wizard who stuck his neck out displays the Ethic of Light, the imperative to be a selfless vehicle of goodness. On a small scale, he exemplifies the morality of supererogation for which the Ethic of Light is a name. The Ethic of Light represents the strand of moral thinking exemplified by utilitarianism, the idea that the right thing to do is the production of, indeed the maximizing of, goodness. But there are two caveats about this association. First, the Ethic of Light may be tied to a rich and complex theory of goodness and value, not to Jeremy Bentham's reduction of them to pleasure. (See Nozick's The Examined Life for a non-utilitarian conception of value.) Second, the Ethic of Light is not morally fundamental, as utilitarians conceive the Principle of Utility to be. It is contrained by three layers of demands for minimal mutilation before it can come into play. Moral heroes are not exempt from respecting rights, responding to the reality of others, and caring for them. They act over and above the duties generated by the other three layers, not without reference to them.
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	CMC Magazine / January 1, 1996
	Wizards, Toads, and Ethics, by Wes Cooper Shaping Voices into a Moral Structure These voices correspond closely enough to a four-layer moral structure which has been recommended recently by the very same philosopher, Robert Nozick, who, in Anarchy, State and Utopia, gave libertarianism its most profound philosophical statement. This structure disputes the presumption that libertarianism is the whole truth about moral constraints and imperatives, while still deeming it morally fundamental. The key to avoiding black-and-white thinking here--"You either respect rights fully or you do wrong"--is Nozick's principle of minimum mutilation. You may pursue higher moral goals than respect for rights, if you do so in such a way as to minimize the infringement of rights. So you may limit Mr. Bungle's right to free speech in the matter of virtual rape, if you do so by toading him rather than, say, forming a vigilante committee to beat him up at his real-life residence. Nozick distinguishes three sources of moral considerations in addition to those comprising the Ethic of Respect, as he calls the libertarian ethic of respect for rights. An Ethic of Responsiveness counsels that one ought to be responsive to the reality of others. Although Nozick's doctrine of reality is technical and contentious, it applies quite naturally to the second voice in the Mr. Bungle affair. The hurt that Mr. Bungle's player did to the women involved brings the Ethic of Responsiveness into play. One would be insensitive to their reality if one merely insisted on the player's right to free speech. An Ethic of Caring builds the third tier of Nozick's new structure, made up of reasons having to do with establishing and maintaining ties of concern, friendship, community, and love. These moral reasons are the ones that have been brought into focus by feminist moral philosophers in recent years. In the present context, however, they define a higher moral goal rather than what's morally fundamental. Respect for rights and responsiveness to the reality of others are morally more basic than ties of caring, I would argue. To exemplify the point without argument: I may not care for another through no defect in me but only because of distance, say; but the other may have a right to something from me, in virtue of a contract perhaps, which trumps my appropriation of that thing for use by those I care about. Or to make the point at the level of the Ethic of Responsiveness, my appropriation of that thing for the comfort of the people I care about might be to trivialize, to fail to be responsive to, the desperate need of the other. The Ethic of Caring is related to the Ethic of Responsiveness by the same minimum mutilation principle that relates Responsiveness to Rights. It counsels not focusing on Mr. Bungle's reality, even though he may desperately need the outlet provided by LambdaMOO, in order to nurture community. Finally, the wizard who stuck his neck out displays the Ethic of Light, the imperative to be a selfless vehicle of goodness. On a small scale, he exemplifies the morality of supererogation for which the Ethic of Light is a name. The Ethic of Light represents the strand of moral thinking exemplified by utilitarianism, the idea that the right thing to do is the production of, indeed the maximizing of, goodness. But there are two caveats about this association. First, the Ethic of Light may be tied to a rich and complex theory of goodness and value, not to Jeremy Bentham's reduction of them to pleasure. (See Nozick's The Examined Life for a non-utilitarian conception of value.) Second, the Ethic of Light is not morally fundamental, as utilitarians conceive the Principle of Utility to be. It is contrained by three layers of demands for minimal mutilation before it can come into play. Moral heroes are not exempt from respecting rights, responding to the reality of others, and caring for them. They act over and above the duties generated by the other three layers, not without reference to them.
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