An Appeal for a Virtual Analog to a Real Life Right

And if we are motivated by the recognition of the reality of the person behind the keyboard, it is a small step to recognize the reality of the character guided by that person. This involves thinking of the character as having value in its own right, in virtue of which it has Lockean rights but also in virtue of its contribution to the goals of the community, etc. Since the character is an extension of the person, it is tempting to suppose that recognition of the reality of the character is just recognition of the real-life person. But consider a female-presenting real-world male: on a MOO she may have a pressing need for a freedom from harrassment that he has no need for. We can respond to her reality, without reference to his. This is the present tip of a future iceberg. As virtual worlds become more complex and come to have their own autonomy, the distinction between the moral status of the player and that of the character will become more distinct.

	CMC Magazine / January 1, 1996
	Wizards, Toads, and Ethics, by Wes Cooper An Appeal for a Virtual Analog to a Real Life Right The next voice I want to highlight in the Bungle affair draws attention to the player behind the character, and how she was affected by the virtual rape. Although real-life gender in cyberspace is somewhat problematic, as my phrase "female-presenting character" suggests, the abused players in this case were indeed female, as Dibbell's journalistic enquiry established. This second voice criticized Mr. Bungle for ignoring their reality and how they were affected by the virtual rape, as though he were simply playing by himself with several puppets. This voice called for Mr. Bungle to be toaded, his virtual life on the MOO brought to an end. Responding to her reality does not mean recognizing that she has a real-life Lockean right to freedom from Mr. Bungle's nastiness on the MOO, for she does not. What it means, perhaps, is recognizing that we members of the MOO have good reason to create a virtual analog of one's real-life right to freedom from sexual abuse. We should transform our Hobbesian place into a Lockean one. And if we are motivated by the recognition of the reality of the person behind the keyboard, it is a small step to recognize the reality of the character guided by that person. This involves thinking of the character as having value in its own right, in virtue of which it has Lockean rights but also in virtue of its contribution to the goals of the community, etc. Since the character is an extension of the person, it is tempting to suppose that recognition of the reality of the character is just recognition of the real-life person. But consider a female-presenting real-world male: on a MOO she may have a pressing need for a freedom from harrassment that he has no need for. We can respond to her reality, without reference to his. This is the present tip of a future iceberg. As virtual worlds become more complex and come to have their own autonomy, the distinction between the moral status of the player and that of the character will become more distinct.
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	CMC Magazine / January 1, 1996
	Wizards, Toads, and Ethics, by Wes Cooper An Appeal for a Virtual Analog to a Real Life Right The next voice I want to highlight in the Bungle affair draws attention to the player behind the character, and how she was affected by the virtual rape. Although real-life gender in cyberspace is somewhat problematic, as my phrase "female-presenting character" suggests, the abused players in this case were indeed female, as Dibbell's journalistic enquiry established. This second voice criticized Mr. Bungle for ignoring their reality and how they were affected by the virtual rape, as though he were simply playing by himself with several puppets. This voice called for Mr. Bungle to be toaded, his virtual life on the MOO brought to an end. Responding to her reality does not mean recognizing that she has a real-life Lockean right to freedom from Mr. Bungle's nastiness on the MOO, for she does not. What it means, perhaps, is recognizing that we members of the MOO have good reason to create a virtual analog of one's real-life right to freedom from sexual abuse. We should transform our Hobbesian place into a Lockean one. And if we are motivated by the recognition of the reality of the person behind the keyboard, it is a small step to recognize the reality of the character guided by that person. This involves thinking of the character as having value in its own right, in virtue of which it has Lockean rights but also in virtue of its contribution to the goals of the community, etc. Since the character is an extension of the person, it is tempting to suppose that recognition of the reality of the character is just recognition of the real-life person. But consider a female-presenting real-world male: on a MOO she may have a pressing need for a freedom from harrassment that he has no need for. We can respond to her reality, without reference to his. This is the present tip of a future iceberg. As virtual worlds become more complex and come to have their own autonomy, the distinction between the moral status of the player and that of the character will become more distinct.
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